Fluctuations in stock prices a¤ect corporate cash ‡ows. When a …rm's own stock price drops signi…cantly, the …rm's customers are less likely to delay payment on invoices. In e¤ect, customers are providing insurance to the …rm. This insurance e¤ect does not exist for private …rms. However, overall customers delay payment on invoices from publicly traded …rms 25 percent more often than they delay payment on invoices from private …rms. The stock price of listed …rms provides a costless signal to customers about the state of their supplier. As far as we can tell this is not driven by a di¤erence in the average quality of the customers. Thus in terms of corporate cash ‡ows there are both costs and bene…ts to being publicly traded. Stock market ‡uctuations are not a "side show" to the economy.
I. Introduction
Day-to-day stock price ‡uctuations provide freely available information on the health of a publicly traded …rm. Customers can condition their payment of invoices on this information. If they do so, then stock price ‡uctuations will a¤ect corporate cash ‡ows.
Suppose a …rms'share price drops, as a re ‡ection of di¢ cult times for the …rm. Will customers be more prompt in paying their bills (an "insurance e¤ect")? Or, will customers be less prompt in paying their bills (a "taking advantage of the weak e¤ect")? Or, will they simply ignore the stock price ‡uctuations ("oblivious")? A priori it is hard to be sure which e¤ect would dominate. These alternative cases have quite di¤erent implications for the e¤ect of stock market ‡uctuations on the economy.
In order to tell these e¤ects apart we need good information not only about daily stock prices, but also about daily customer payments patterns. In order to control for overall changes in industry conditions it is helpful to have information not only about public …rms, but also about otherwise similar private …rms. We have such data for a population of French …rms from 1998-2004. The data set contains more than 1 million daily observations about customer delayed payment on invoices.
The …rst issue is to compare the payment delays facing public …rms to the payment delays facing private …rms. Are publicly traded …rms customers are more, or less likely to delay payment? The private …rm customers cannot condition their invoice payments on the selling …rm's public stock price since it does not exist. Stock price ‡uctuation information is however readily available for public …rms. Customers can elect to treat publicly traded …rms di¤erently from private …rms.
Empirically, it is easy to reject the idea that the stock market is unimportant. On average customers do pay invoices of public and private …rms di¤erently. Publicly listed …rms face 25% more customer delays on an invoice compared to unlisted …rms.
The second issue is to compare the payment delays facing public …rms with strong recent stock market performance, to the payment delays facing public …rms with weak recent stock market performance. How do customer payment patterns change when they observe a stock price decline for the …rm that they owe an invoice? It could go either way.
The "insurance e¤ect"would imply more prompt payments and few delays by customers.
The "taking advantage e¤ect"would imply lengthier delay and more customer delays.
Empirically we …nd that stock price declines do a¤ect repayments. Moderately to very large stock price declines signi…cantly reduce the likelihood of customer delay. Over this range of parameters the evidence supports the insurance motive rather than the taking advantage motive.
For these results it is the …rm's own stock price change that matters. However one can also ask what happens when the overall stock market changes? In such cases the information can be taken into account by customers both of the private and the public …rms. Empirically we …nd that declines in the CAC stock market index tends to increase customer invoice delays. This is found for both listed and unlisted …rms.
This paper adds to a growing literature examining the e¤ects of stock price ‡uctuations on real activity. Dye Our results suggest that the impact of stock market ‡uctuation may not only a¤ect long term corporate decisions, but also the shorter term realized corporate cash ‡ows.
Hence, we provide further evidence that the stock market may a¤ect the real economy and is not just a "sideshow" (Mork, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990) . Somewhat related evidence is provided by Giammarino et al. (2004) who show that managers use the information contained in equity prices when deciding whether or not to go ahead with a seasoned equity o¤ering and Luo (2005) , who show that the positive correlation between announcement date return and the completion of a merger can be interpreted as insiders learning from outsiders about the likelihood of success of a merger.
The evidence in the paper further supports the notion that trade credit links among …rms serve to insure …rms against liquidity shocks (Wilner, 2000 , Cunat, 2007 , Boissay and Gropp, 2007 . The evidence in this paper suggests, however, that this insurance function is not limited to small credit constrained …rms, as in Boissay and Gropp, 2007 and Cunat, 2007 , but that also large, listed …rms may bene…t from some insurance. This is further evidence that the puzzle of the prevalent use of trade credit among …rms despite its high implicit interest rate may in part be explained by this insurance function that appears to be unavailable from other sources (Peterson and Rajan, 1997).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a simple model of buyer/seller interaction that guides our empirical hypotheses and sketches a potential transmission mechanism from stock prices to the real economy. In section 3 we describe the data used in the paper and show our procedures for obtaining a matched sample of listed and private …rms used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 contains the main results, section 5 presents some robustness checks and section 6 concludes the paper.
II. Theory
In order to help …x ideas, consider the following simple model of the transmission of stock market ‡uctuations to …rms'cash ‡ows. A buyer purchases one unit of some good at price p and and promises to pay this on the due date. After agreeing to the contract, but before the invoice is due, some buyers experience adverse liquidity shocks. These shocks are not observable to the seller and, hence, are not contractible.
Given the state of liquidity at the time the payment is due, the buyer has to decide whether to pay on time or not. If the buyer pays on time the game ends. If the buyer does not pay on time, the seller must decide whether to spend resources to collect the bill, or whether to accommodate the buyer by extending the due date. Collection is costly, for example due to legal fees, foreclosure costs or other legal expenses. As a result, if the seller collects, his payo¤ will be less than the full amount of the bill due.
Buyer payo¤s are denoted as B k;i where k 2 fE; Lg and i 2 fd; c; lg. R denotes the buyer's cash on hand. Type E buyers have enough cash ‡ow to satisfy their obligations to the seller. Hence, for these buyers p R. In contrast, type L buyers received an adverse liquidity shock which caused a delay in the arrival of R until after the due date of the payment. These buyers have insu¢ cient cash to make the payment.
The buyer can pay the invoice when it is due, d and he can try to pay the invoice late.
If the seller responds to late payment by collecting, the payo¤ to the buyer is denoted by subscript c. If the seller responds to late payment by accommodating the delay, the payo¤ to the buyer is denoted by the subscript l. Sellers are characterized by being either private …rms and public …rms and by being either "good" or "bad", which will be de…ned below. The state of the public …rm is common knowledge, the state of the private …rm is private information to the seller. We denote the risk free rate at which cash not needed immediately for the operations of the …rm can be deposited with r. Both types of buyers also are endowed with some non-liquid wealth, W .
If the buyer pays the invoice when it is due, the seller has nothing to decide and simply accepts payment. If the buyer does not pay the invoice when it is due, then the seller must decide whether to spend resources to collect the invoice, or to simply wait for the buyer to pay late. If the seller decides to collect, then the buyer pays right away and su¤ers a reputation cost denoted as h, with h > 0.
Consider the following sequence of events:
1. At time t, the buyer purchases a good from the seller at price p and both agree on a contract governing the terms of payment.
2. At time t + 1, type E buyers receive cash ‡ow R, which is private information to the buyer. The state of the seller is revealed to the seller only (if he is private) or to both buyers and seller (if he is public).
3. Time t + 2 is the initially agreed upon due date of payment. The Buyer decides whether to pay on time or whether to delay payment. If the Buyer delays payment, the Seller decides whether to collect or not. If he collects he receives the payment from the seller immediately. If there is collection, the buyer su¤ers a reputation cost h.
4. At time t + 3, the type L buyers receive cash ‡ow R and pay the seller if they decided to pay late and the seller did not collect. All payo¤s are realized.
The assumption that the liquidity shock to the buyer is private information to the buyer and that the seller's state is only revealed after signing the contract are crucial for the model. This prevents the buyer and seller from agreeing on di¤erent maturity contracts, depending on the buyer's and seller's states, respectively. With uncertainty about the seller's state upon signing of the contract, all contracts will be short term (i.e. mature in period t+2, rather than t+3), as the seller has to take into account the possibility that he will be in the "bad"state.
A. Buyer's Payo¤s
A.1. For types E At time t + 3 the type E buyer receives the following payo¤s:
The type E buyer does not need to liquidate its wealth W in order to make the payment as they have su¢ cient cash ‡ow R. However, he can still choose whether to pay late or not. If he pays late and the seller decides to collect, rather than accommodate late payment, he su¤ers a loss of reputation, h. His gain from paying late is the risk free return from depositing the purchase price p in a deposit account, rp.
Payo¤ ordering
The ordering of the type E buyer payo¤s is given by:
The buyer prefers to pay late and not be collected. However, if he thinks the seller will collect, he will prefer to pay on time. In equilibrium, the type E buyer will always pay on time as long as the risk free rate, r is small and there is some non-zero probability that the seller will collect. The model implies that generally …rms pay on time. 
A.2. For types L
The payo¤ structure is di¤erent for a type L buyer, who is short of liquidity. In this case the buyer does not have the cash on hand to pay the seller. He is faced with the choice to liquidate assets at a liquidation cost , with > 0, and pay on time or to pay late. As before, if he pays late, he may face collection:
Payo¤ ordering
The ordering of the type L buyer payo¤s is given by:
No matter whether the buyer's has enough cash on hand (type E) or does not due to an adverse liquidity shock (type L), the buyer's pro…ts are highest when he pays late and there is no collection. The buyer's pro…ts are lowest when he does not pay on time and the seller decides to collect. The buyers pro…ts are intermediate when he pays the invoice when it is due.
B. Seller's Payo¤s
The seller's payo¤ is denoted as S c;j , where c 2 fC G ; C B g and j 2 fd; c; lg. C G denotes the amount of cash ‡ow available to a "good" seller and C B the amount of cash ‡ow available to a "bad" seller. We assume C B < C G . The subscripts are as before, referring to prompt payment by the buyer, d, late collected payment by the buyer, c and late accommodated payment by the buyer, l.
We de…ne m o as cash that the seller spends on operations, m b as "extra cash"beyond that needed for operations that generates the risk-free rate of return r. m c is the expense the seller must incur when he decides to collect. The collection cost m c is a …xed cost with 0 < m c < p. Sellers need cash to run their …rm, i.e. they need to pay wages, suppliers etc. Cash is transformed into operations with f (m 0 ), with f 0 (:) > 0 and f 00 < 0. We need f (:) to be twice di¤erentiable and concave for the following to hold. We do not need f (:)
to have any particular functional form, however.
B.1. Type G
Sellers maximize the following programme:
We set the parameters of the model such that type G sellers always reach the …rst best solution:
The marginal return to cash of the type G sellers is just the risk-free rate. This is equivalent to assuming that there is no wedge between borrowing and lending rates for type G sellers. They are not credit constrained (see e.g. Kaplan and Zingales, 1997 ).
This implies the following solution:
Payo¤ ordering
Since type G sellers always achieve the …rst best solution, for 8j 2 fd; c; lg we have:
which means that the good seller always prefers to be paid on time. If he is not paid on time, then the good seller faces a trade-o¤ between collecting the money at a cost m c and investing the extra money at the risk free rate r, or not to collect and wait for late payment. For good sellers the marginal gain of collecting is equal to the risk free rate.
Good sellers will prefer to wait for the late payment (and not to collect) if:
Hence, good sellers prefer to wait rather than to collect the money, if the collection cost is high enough. Note that if there is no opportunity cost of waiting (r = 0), then good sellers never collect the money. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we will assume that the risk-free rate is zero, i.e. r = 0: This implies that good sellers never collect, as long as
The main point here is that they never collect because they are not dependent on their cash ‡ow to reach their …rst best level of production. Recall that if r = 0 and for non-zero probabilities of being collected, type E buyers always pay on time.
B.2. For types B
The maximization programme for type B sellers is equivalent to the one for Type G sellers:
The only di¤erence to type G sellers, is that for type B sellers the budget constraint is binding:
which means that for type B sellers, the marginal gain from collecting is not the risk free rate but rather the return to using cash in operations. Type B sellers are cash constrained.
This implies the following payo¤s:
The best type B sellers can do is use their entire cash on operations.
Payo¤ ordering
While type B sellers also prefer to be paid on time, we have for 8j 2 fd; c; lg:
If he is not paid on time, the type B seller faces the trade-o¤ between collecting the money at a cost m c and spend the extra money on operations at a marginal gain of
2 For bad sellers, the marginal gain of collecting is equal to the marginal productivity of money in the operations of the …rm. Bad sellers will prefer to collect rather than wait for the late payment if:
Since we have assumed parameters (in (3)) such that f (C B + p) > f (C B ) + p, we know that there exists m c > 0 such that the above inequality holds. This is independent of the risk free rate. In contrast to type G sellers, type B sellers may collect if the collection cost is low relative to the marginal bene…t of having additional cash to fund operations.
C. Equilibrium
The inequalities (2) and (5) are key. In order to obtain more easily interpretable results, suppose now further that while the buyer cannot observe the state of the seller in case of a private …rm, he can assign probabilities to each state. The ex ante probability that the buyer assigns to the possibility that the seller's state is G is denoted as Pr(G), and the ex ante probability that the seller's state is B is denoted as Pr(B), with Pr(G) > 0; Pr(B) > 0, and Pr(B) + Pr(G) = 1. First recall that type E buyers are indi¤erent between paying a type G seller on time or late. Since the buyer cannot observe the private seller's type they will always pay the private seller on time.
2 Note that it is easy to see that
What Suppose that the seller is a private …rm. Now the buyer will use the ex ante probabilities Pr(G), and Pr(B) to guide his choice. Then type L buyers will pay the invoice when it is due, provided 
D. Empirical predictions
The model has a number of empirical predictions regarding the patterns of payments between buyers and sellers in the economy and the impact of stock price ‡uctuations on corporate cash ‡ows, which we test below:
Hypothesis 1 (Signal availability) : Public …rms face more payment delays than private …rms.
Hypothesis 1 is based on the idea that for public …rms a signal about their type is available. If buyers take this signal into account when deciding whether to pay late or on time, as our model postulates, hypothesis 1 follows. Support for hypothesis 1 would also imply a trade-o¤ to being publicly listed: While the …rm presumably will have more easy access to equity capital, it will also su¤er an adverse e¤ect on its cash ‡ow. This hypothesis is complementary to the insurance e¤ect documented in Boissay and Gropp (2007) , who show that large liquid …rms accommodate more payment delays. In that paper, the insurance was provided by the seller to the buyer. In Hypothesis 3, the insurance would be provided by the buyer to the seller: If the seller is in bad shape, buyers make their payments more promptly. This also would suggest that while being publicly listed entails the costs of facing more payment delays on average (e.g. of acting as insurer more often), listed …rms also enjoy insurance. Both e¤ects do not exist for unlisted private …rms.
III. Data
In order to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we need good information not only about daily stock prices, but also about daily customer payment patterns, as well as balance sheet information for unlisted and listed …rms. Such data exist for France in the combination of three distinct data sources: the CIPE database on trade credit delays, the FIBEN database on …rm balance sheets (both from the Banque de France), and Datastream for …rms' stock prices. CIPE contains daily information about payment delays on bills of exchange in France, namely: the day of the non-payment (e.g. when it was due but was not paid), the amount of the bill of exchange that remained unpaid, the identity of the buyer, the seller, and the reason for the payment delay. There are three main reasons for payment delays: (i) disagreement (there was disagreement over the quality of the goods delivered), (ii) illiquidity (there were insu¢ cient funds in the buyers bank account to cover the payment), and (iii) insolvency (the buyer …led for bankruptcy or is in a liquidation process). There are about 11.6 millions payment delays recorded in CIPE over the period 1998-2004. Detailed descriptive statistics for CIPE and institutional information on the compilation of the data are given in Bardos and Stili (2006) and Boissay & Gropp (2007) . 3 FIBEN contains annual balance sheets for about 160,000 private and 430 listed …rms from 1998 to 2004 (after excluding the public sector, agriculture, energy, health, education, and domestic services, the …nancial sector, and holding companies), for which we can obtain daily stock price information from Datastream. The sample period, which is determined by the availability of payment delay data is 1998-2004. We built our data set in two steps. First, to obtain a meaningful control group for listed …rms, we used propensity score matching (Todd, 2006) to construct a matched sample of listed and unlisted …rms.
For this matched sample of listed and unlisted …rms, we obtained the daily payment delays from CIPE and the daily stock prices from Datastream.
A. The Firm Matching Process
We identi…ed the private companies similar to listed companies by estimating the probability of being listed as a function of a number of important …rm characteristics, that is age, size (assets), …nancial health (summarized by the Z-scores computed by the 3 The data on trade credit delays in France have only been used for research by these two papers. There are treated as highly con…dential by the Banque de France and can only be used on the premise of the Banque. variables are only available at an annual frequency, we estimated the model using annual data. 5 We used a Logit model, whose estimates are shown in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here]
As expected, …rms are signi…cantly more likely to be listed when they are older and larger. However, …nancial health does not seem to have an e¤ect. We computed the propensity score for every …rm i and every year t. We paired, for each year, each listed company i together with the unlisted company that had a propensity score closest to …rm i's in that year. We imposed a common support condition by keeping the matches only when the di¤erence between the two probabilities was smaller than 0:01 ("caliper matching"). Ultimately this yielded a match of 395 listed with 1560 unlisted companies, as the best match for a given listed …rm may be a di¤erent unlisted …rm depending on the year considered.
To get a sense of how successful we matched public and private …rms, we report in Table 2 the means and quartiles of the distribution of the main …rm balance sheet characteristics for listed and unlisted …rms, respectively.
[ Table 2 about here]
The matching process appears to have successfully yielded very similar distributions of main …rm characteristics (size, age and quality, as measured by the Z-score) for listed and unlisted …rms. We …nd that unlisted …rms are slightly younger and smaller on average than listed …rms. However, these di¤erences are not statistically signi…cant. The distribution of the Z-score also shows no signi…cant di¤erence and the distribution across sectors, which is reported in Table 3 , shows a close match across sectors. 4 For detail on the computation of the credit score computed by the Banque de France see Banque de France (2006b) and Bardos et al., (2004) . 5 For the …rms that went public or that were delisted during the period, we classi…ed them as listed from the year they became listed onward or until the year they were delisted, respectively.
[ Table 3 about here]
B. The data set
In the second step, we merged for these …rms the information on trade credit delays (CIPE), stock market prices (Datastream), and balance sheets (FIBEN). The main di¢ -culty in merging the three data sets is their di¤erent frequencies. While payment delays and stock prices are measured on a daily frequency, balance sheet data are available at an annual frequency only. We decided to construct a weekly data set by summarizing information on trade credit delays and stock market prices for each …rm and calendar week. 6 We computed the weekly stock returns as well as stock price decline dummies equal to one if the weekly stock return of …rm i in week t was below a certain threshold.
In our baseline model, the threshold is the …rst decile of the distribution of stock returns in our sample, which corresponds to a weekly return equal to -7.9%. We also consider alternative thresholds below (see Appendix A4 for more details). As for payment delays, we calculated the total amount of delayed trade credit due to …rm i in week t divided by …rm i's receivables in the previous calendar year (delay it ). When …rm i did not face any payment delay in week t (i.e. the …rm is not present in CIPE in week t), we assigned the value 0 to delay it . Then we merged the transformed weekly data with the balance sheet data of the previous calendar year. 7 Note that this implies that the same balance sheet information is assigned to a given …rm 52 times per year. Ultimately, our panel While Table 2 shows that the distributions of age, assets, and …nancial health indicators are essentially identical across public and private …rms in our sample, table 4 shows signi…cant di¤erences in delays faced due to illiquidity. Public …rms are paid late 25% more often than private …rms. Given the two types of …rms face a delay, however, there is no di¤erence between the unpaid amount.
[ Table 4 about here]
IV. Empirical Implementation and Results
We estimate the amount of payment delays faced by a seller on a given day as a function of the seller's balance sheet characteristics, whether or not the seller is publicly traded and the seller's stock returns. The dependent variable is the amount of delays faced by …rm i in week t due to illiquidity divided by annual receivables (delay it ). We use payment delays due to illiquidity only, as we are interested in whether buyers tend to adjust default if they are short of cash to fund the operations of the …rm. We estimate the model in weekly frequency (we check alternative frequencies in section V) using a tobit model as the dependent variable is censored at zero (no delays faced). The baseline model is therefore:
where X ik represents a set of control variables of …rm i and period k, where k represents the latest information available at time t 1. These controls include the logarithm of the age (age it ), the logarithm of …rm i's assets (assets ik ), and receivables divided by total assets (receivables ik ). Given that the dependent variable is re-scaled by receivables, receivables is used as control for …rms'willingness to accommodate their customers. The idea is that the …rms that grant trade credit disproportionately (with respect to their assets) may also be more likely to be more lenient vis-à-vis their customers'late payments. In addition, we include liquid assets (liquid asset ik ) as proxies for …rms'available cash, as well as bank debt (bank debt ik ) and used credit lines (overdraf t ik ) as proxies for the debt capacity of the …rm. All these balance sheet items are divided by total assets and re ‡ect the latest available information in period t 1. Based on the simple model presented, we would expect that customers tend to default to …rms less likely to aggressively pursue collection of the payment. This implies that (based on the last available information) larger, older, and more liquid …rms are expected to face more delays. Similarly, we would expect …rms with more debt and more used overdrafts to face fewer delays. In the controls we also include time (monthly and annual dummies, as well as 25 two-digit sectoral dummies.
With the sectoral dummies we attempt to control for shocks that may a¤ect the seller and the buyer simultaneously. 8 We do not report the coe¢ cients of the dummies below;
the results are available from the authors upon request.
The main variables of interest are listed i , decline it 1 , own it 1 , and index t 1 . The variable listed i is a time-invariant dummy variable equal to one if …rm i is both listed at the French stock exchange and actively traded over the sample period (see Appendix A3).
9
The variable decline it 1 represents a dummy variable equal to one if …rm i's stock price i's stock return in week t 1. This variable is included to control for the e¤ect of "normal" ‡uctuations in the …rms'stock price. Finally to control for overall market e¤ects we also include the returns of the CAC40 (the most important stock market index in France) in week t 1, index t 1 . Based on the model, we would expect listed …rms to face more delays than unlisted …rms ("signal availability"). We would also expect …rms that experience sharp falls in their stock returns to face fewer delays ("insurance" mechanism).
The results for the baseline model are given in model 1 of Table 5 . The control variables tend to support the insurance hypothesis. Larger and older …rms face more delays and the coe¢ cients are signi…cant at least at the one percent threshold. Firms with higher 8 Note that this problem would be particularly severe if we found that delays faced increase with stock price declines. This is not what we …nd, however (see below). 9 There are a few listed …rms in France that are listed but tend not to be traded. We classi…ed these …rms as unlisted in the below. Changing their classi…cation makes no di¤erence in the results reported below.
receivables-to-asset ratios face disproportionately more delays, which suggests that some …rms are intrinsically more lenient with their customers, and in the sense that they both grant more trade credit and accommodate a greater proportion of late payments. Higher quality …rms (with lower scores) face more delays, which supports our notion of the existence of insurance that is taken advantage of only if the insuring …rm has access to outside …nance. Given …nancial health, whether or not …rms have liquid assets or are close to their debt capacity has no e¤ect on facing payment delays. Now turn to the variables of interest. We …nd that listed …rms face signi…cantly more payment delays. The coe¢ cient of listed i is signi…cant at the 1 percent level. We interpret this as evidence that stock returns may potentially help the customers delineate good …rms (that will accommodate delays) and bad …rms (that will not). Consistent with the predictions of the model (hypothesis 2), decline it 1 is signi…cantly negative: Listed …rms whose stock returns sharply decrease face signi…cantly fewer delays. A sharp fall in the stock price of a …rm seems to convey speci…c information to its customers as to whether the …rm is willing to accommodate delays. This is the core message of this paper.
It suggests a transmission mechanism from stock price ‡uctuations to the real economy.
Like stock index variations (index t 1 ), normal variations in the …rm stock price have a signi…cant negative e¤ect on the amount of default faced. In normal times, the higher the …rm stock or stock index returns, the lower the amount of payment delays the listed …rm faces. We interpret this as a business cycle e¤ect: if the economy is performing poorly, the propensity of all …rms to delay payment increases.
[ Table 5 about here] These results are robust to including the Z-score (score it 1 ) into the baseline (model 2). With score, which re ‡ects the probability that the …rm goes bankrupt within the next three years, we want to control for …rm's …nancial health. Again, in line with the insurance hypothesis, we …nd that healthy …rms accommodate signi…cantly more delays than unhealthy …rms. Next, we check whether, for some unobserved reason, public …rms' customers are di¤erent from the customers of private …rms (model 3). There are two main reasons why customer quality controls might be important. One, our results may be driven by the possibility that public …rms simply have poorer customers than private …rms. Note that the fact that we …nd that the …rms that are of higher quality face more delays is a …rst indication that this does not seem to drive our results. Nevertheless, we include the average score of the …rm's customers to control for this possibility. Second, our story about mutual liquidity insurance is correct, but listed …rms face more delays not because of an observable signal about their quality, but because they have longer term relationships with their customers. 10 We attempt to control for this e¤ect by including the average age of the customers. We also included the average assets of the …rms'customers, with the idea that smaller …rms are more likely to be liquidity constrained. If public …rms customers are signi…cantly smaller than the customers of private …rms, this could result in a positive coe¢ cient on listed i in the absence of any signalling e¤ect of the stock price.
The model includes the same set of control variables as model 2. None of the customer quality controls are statistically signi…cant and all results remain unchanged.
So far we have used the stock price decline during the past week as our measure of an adverse signal about the supplier. Are our …ndings robust if we use longer term declines?
This is explored in model 4. All variables are de…ned as before, except decline it 1 , which is now equal to one if the supplier's stock price decline was in the negative 10 percent tail during the previous month (rather than previous week), and own t 1 and index t 1 , which are now also computed on a monthly basis. The control variables are una¤ected by these changes. All retain their sign, signi…cance and economic magnitude. The coe¢ cients on the main variables of interest are also the same as for the weekly stock price declines.
Listed …rms face more delays and if their stock price declines substantially, the amount of delays they face decreases.
V. Robustness
We explore the robustness of our results in four main dimensions. One, we vary the size of the tails used to compute the stock price decline. In the baseline model we used the 10 percent negative tail of returns and we explore the sensitivity of the results to using 5 percent or 15 percent tails (models 5 and 6 in table 6). Second, we interact the stock price decline dummy with a proxy for the ex-ante likelihood that a …rm (model 7) is …nancially constrained. Based on the model presented earlier in the paper, we would expect …rms ex ante more likely to be credit constrained to pursue their customers for payment more aggressively once hit with an adverse shocks than other …rms. Third, we vary the frequency of the data set. Whereas in the baseline results, the amount of delays faced were measured on a weekly basis, we explore what happens if we consider monthly or daily amounts of payment delay faced as a function of monthly or weekly stock price declines, respectively (models 8 and 9). Finally, we explore two alternative candidate explanations for our main results: agency costs and reverse causality.
[ Table 6 about here]
What happens if we de…ne the stock price decline dummy based on the 5 percent and 15 percent tails of the distribution? In both models 5 and 6, all control variables retain their sign and signi…cance relative to model 3, and the coe¢ cient on decline it 1 remains negative and statistically signi…cant. 11 This result suggests that customers react to a wide range of negative stock returns. How large must the stock price decline be in order for the customers to change their behavior and increase the timeliness of their payment? To answer this question we estimated our model with a series of stock price decline dummies that decompose the entire distribution of stock returns into 5%-quantiles. The coe¢ cients and the 5% con…dence intervals of the dummies are reported in chart 1. The vertical axis shows these coe¢ cients as we move from using the 5% tail to the distribution up to the 11 In these models, decline it 1 is a dummy equal to one if …rm i's weekly stock return is below -11.5% (5% tail of the stock return distribution) or -5.9% (15% tail) in week t 1. median. We …nd that customers pay their trade debt more promptly to the suppliers whose weekly stock returns is below 7.9% (…rst decile of the distribution). This has a positive e¤ect on the cash ‡ows of those …rms su¤ering adverse shocks re ‡ected in their stock price. For stock returns outside of the …rst decile, customers do not react to ‡uctuations in the stock price of their supplier. Most notably, we do not …nd that very large increases in the stock price of the supplier have any e¤ect on the timeliness of the customers'payments.
In model 7 we interact the stock price decline dummy with the …rm's Z-score. We distinguish between …rms in the bottom two thirds of the distribution of score and …rms in the top third. We would expect that if …rms are already in poor health (a high score) before the stock price decline, the insurance e¤ect may be larger. In addition, in Boissay and Gropp (2007) we found that score may be a good indicator of the probability of a …rm being …nancially constrained. In line with the simple model presented above, if …rms that are already likely to be credit constrained that may result in an even stronger collection e¤ort if an additional adverse shock hits. Note that customers do not directly observe score (con…dential information at the Banque de France), but do observe the individual balance sheet ratios that are used to calculate score (see Appendix B). We …nd that the reduction in payment delays is about twice as large for …rms more likely to be …nancially constrained, although this di¤erence is only marginally signi…cant at the 10% level.
Next, we estimated the model using monthly and daily frequencies in order to check whether there is anything particular about the weekly frequency we chose in the baseline speci…cation. The number of observations is reduced to a quarter when moving to the monthly data set. In contrast, when moving from weekly to daily data, we multiply the number of observations by seven (to more than 1 million …rm/day observations). In both cases, all controls retain their signi…cance and sign relative to model 3. The only exceptions are the stock market index (index t 1 ), which is no longer signi…cant, and the …rm's own stock return (own t 1 ), which is not signi…cant in the daily model. We continue to …nd that stock price declines of the supplier result in customers increasing the timeliness of their payments.
Finally, while we …nd strong support for the main hypotheses generated by our simple model, there may be other stories also consistent with the results that we obtain. We thought of two such stories. One, the evidence presented may be unrelated to …nancial constraints the marginal value of an additional euro for operations, but rather re ‡ect agency problems of listed …rms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Barnea, 1985) . Unlisted …rms may su¤er to a much smaller extent from diverging interests between the owners of the …rm and its managers. Hence, in the case of unlisted …rms, management is enforcing the contracts with its customers more stringently, resulting in fewer delays. While this would indeed be an interesting interpretation of our …nding that listed …rms face substantially more defaults compared to unlisted …rms, it does not explain why in the face of a substantial decline in the stock price, these agency problems are reduced, resulting in fewer payment delays. Further, the evidence directly contradicts the idea that managers of listed …rms like cash (Jensen and Meckling, 1984), which may enable them to extract private bene…ts. In this paper we …nd that listed …rms'customers are less likely to pay on time, suggesting less available free cash for managers. Overall, we reject agency costs as an explanation for our …ndings.
The second alternative explanation for our …ndings relies on reverse causality. Suppose …rms in bad shape give early payment discounts to their customers to encourage them to pay in a more timely manner. The market learns about this practice and interprets it -correctly-as evidence that the …rm is doing poorly. As a consequence, the stock price declines. This story could explain the negative relationship between declines and delays that we …nd, but is inconsistent with the model presented in the paper. Stock price ‡uctuations would be the result of changes in payment patterns rather than the trigger for changes in payment patterns. Stock price ‡uctuations, based on this interpretation would have no real economic e¤ects.
We would reject this interpretation of the evidence presented in the paper on the following grounds. Prices charged to di¤erent customers are unobservable, as …rms have an incentive to charge di¤erential prices to customers, depending on their elasticity of demand and di¤erences in equilibrium search costs (Salop and Stiglitz, 1983). If prices are not observable to the market, then the story implies that payment delays are observable and provide information to the stock market. The information on payment delays used in this paper are part of a con…dential data base maintained by the Banque de France and are not accessible to the public. Nevertheless, the information about a …rm granting generous payment conditions may simply leak via the customers of the …rm to the public.
Hence, we estimated out baseline regression with a reverse timing: do payment delays today result in stock market declines tomorrow. We …nd no evidence that this is the case, payment delays in this regression are insigni…cant. The results are available from the authors upon request.
VI. Conclusions
A model is presented in which the buyer of a good takes the seller's stock price change into account when deciding whether to pay the invoice in a timely manner. The model outlines a new transmission mechanism from stock price ‡uctuations to real economic activity. The model also implies that unlisted …rms, for which information about their state is not readily available, face fewer defaults. Hence, the model shows that there may be advantages and disadvantages in terms of cash ‡ow to being listed: Listed …rms on average face more defaults but when in trouble also bene…t from insurance through their customers who pay in a more timely manner.
We …nd strong empirical support for these predictions of the model. Using a unique data base on trade credit delays for French …rms, we document that listed …rms are about 25% more likely to face payment delays from their customers when compared to similar unlisted …rms. If a listed …rm faces a signi…cant stock price decline (at least in the bottom 10% of the distribution of stock returns), buyers are more likely to pay their bills promptly.
Listed …rms are insured by their customers.
12 Hence, the paper documents empirically that stock price ‡uctuations are associated with changes in the payment rates on invoices, 12 These empirical results may also have implications for the e¤ects of stock price ‡uctuations on investment. While the insurance e¤ect documented in this paper may dampen adverse e¤ect of stock price ‡uctuations on investment of listed …rm, it may amplify investment e¤ects for the customers of these …rms. This is so, because listed …rms are no longer willing to insure their customers against adverse liquidity shocks. Hence, such shocks, combined with a larger investment sensitivity of cash ‡ow, may result in relatively large reductions in investment among small …rms. and so a …rm's cash ‡ow is a¤ected by the …rm's own stock price performance. This suggests a new channel of transmission from …nancial market ‡uctuations to real activity.
It is common to think about stock prices as the discounted sums of exogenously given expected future cash ‡ows. In this paper we have theorized that a reverse channel might exist. The stock prices might a¤ect the corporate cash ‡ows by means of the invoice payment decisions of customers. We have provided empirical evidence in support of such an e¤ect. The stock market is not just a sideshow for the economy. The model was estimated using an unbalanced panel of annual data for all …rms in FIBEN, of which 430 are listed and more than 160,000 unlisted. The dependent variable is the dummy listed it of whether …rm i was listed in year t.
Tables and Graphs
The explanatory variables include the logarithm of age (age it ), the logarithm of assets (assets it ), as well as their square values (age 2 it and assets 2 it ), and a credit score variable (Z-score it ) in year t, which is a synthetic indicator of …rms'…nancial health similar to Altman's Z-score calculated by the Banque de France. The model also includes sector, region, and time speci…c dummies. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the …rm level using the generalised method of Huber-White are reported in parentheses. *,**: Signi…cant at 5% and 1% level. Statistics computed on the annual data for the subsets of public and private …rms. In all models the dependent variable is the weekly amount of payment delays faced by …rm i in week t due to illiquidity, as a fraction of …rm i's receivables in the previous year. The explanatory variables are the current logarithm of the age of the …rm in number of years (age it ), the latest available information on the logarithm of total assets (assets ik ), the latest available receivables divided by total assets (receivables ik ), latest available liquid assets divided by total assets (liquid assets ik ), latest available total bank debt (including used credit lines) divided by total assets (bank debt ik ), latest available used credit lines divided by total assets (overdraft ik ), and the latest availabe Z-score. listed i is a dummy that is equal to one if …rm i is listed and zero otherwise. decline it 1 , is a dummy equal to one if the stock price of …rm i declined (bottom 10% of the distribution) signi…cantly over the previous week (models 1 to 3) or month (model 4). own it 1 represents the weekly (monthly) stock market variation of …rm i's stock; index it 1 represents the weekly ‡uctuations in the CAC 40 stock market index. customer assets ik represents the latest available average log of total assets of the customers of …rm i.
customer age it represents the age of the customers of …rm i and customer score ik the average score of the customers of …rm i:All variables are de…ned in Appendix B. All regressions include 25 sector dummies (2 digit level), year and month dummies. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the …rm level using Huber/White are in parentheses. **,* signi…cant at 1% and 5% respectively. 
Appendix
This appendix describes the initial datasets that we use to compile the working data and provides more detailed information on the merger process.
A1. Balance Sheet Data
The balance sheet database "FIBEN" contains unconsolidated balance sheet information about closely-held and incorporated businesses that operated in France over the pe- 14 The quality of the data is very high regarding all variables (in particular, we know the identity of all defaulters) except for the identity of suppliers facing default. For the …rms facing default, only …rm names and not the identi…cation numbers of the …rms are available. We infered the missing identi…cation numbers by using a correspondence table between …rm names and these numbers provided to us by the Banque de France. See Boissay & Gropp (2007) for more details.
A4. Merging of the data sets
Our data set is a weekly panel built from the balance sheet, the CIPE, and the Datastream data, as well as the sample of public and private …rms, which we matched together by a propensity score technique (see section A). To construct this panel, we proceeded in two steps.
First, we summarized the information on trade credit delays and stock market prices for each …rm and calendar week. For each …rm i and week t, we calculated the amount of unpaid trade debt due to customers' …nancial distress faced by …rm i during week t divided by the …rm i's receivables in the previous calendar year (delay it ). We rescaled this ratio by multiplying it by 1,000. When …rm i did not face any payment delay in week t (i.e. the …rm is not present in CIPE in that week), we assigned a value 0 to the respective statistics on payment delays but kept its balance sheet information in the database. As for stock prices, we calculated weekly stock returns for each …rm i in week t (own it ). When the return was missing in a given week, we considered that the …rm was not traded in and assigned a zero stock return to it for that week. Note that French …rms are not all actively traded. Out of the 430 listed …rms with balance sheets, 360
show non-zero stock returns more than 50% of the time. These …rms, which we de…ne as "actively" traded, are of particular interest to us because their stock price is more informative than for other listed …rms. Hence we explicitly distinguish these …rms by creating a dummy equal to one if …rm i is both listed and regularly traded over the period it is listed (listed & traded i ) and another dummy equal to one if …rm i is listed but not actively traded (listed & not traded i ). We also created a stock price decline dummy (decline it ) equal to one if the weekly stock return of …rm i in week t is below a certain threshold. Our baseline threshold is 7:9%, which corresponds to the …rst decile of the overall distribution of stock returns in our sample; hence, this threshold remains constant over the whole sample period. asset it : Log(total assets) liquid asset it : (cash+marketable securities)/total assets receivables it : receivables/total assets bank debt it : total bank debt/total assets overdraft it : bank debt shorter than one year/total assets listed i : Dummy equal to one if …rm i is both listed and traded more than 50% of the time score3years it : Z-score of the …rm calculated by the Banque de France, re ‡ecting the probability to go bankrupt at a 3-year horizon delay it : 1000*total amount of unpaid debt that was due to …rm i in week t (when the late payment is due to customer's illiquidity), divided by …rm i's receivables in the previous calendard year own it : Firm i's own weekly (monthly) stock return in week t: stock price on Friday of week t-stock price on Friday of week t-1)/stock price on Friday of week t-1 decline it : Dummy equal to one if own it is in the bottom decile of own (bottom 5%, bottom 15%) index t : CAC40 weekly (monthly) growth rate in week t = (CAC40 on Friday of week t-CAC40 on Friday of week t-1)/CAC40 on Friday of week t-1 customer assets it : Average total assets of the customers of the …rm's sector (sector speci…c) customer age it : Average total age of the customers of the …rm's sector (sector speci…c) customer score it : Average score of the customers of the …rm's sector (sector speci…c)Customer Quality Controls
